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COMMENTAI

ES

TORTE-NONFEASANCE-RESCUE AND FORESEEAEIEITX.Matthews v. MacLaren' is a spectacular case, the facts of which, according to Justice Jessup, "might have been contrived for a bar
exam". 1n the early spring of 1966, MacLaren, the owner of a
cabin cruiser called the "Ogopogo" took some friends for a cruise
on his boat from Oakville to Port Credit, Ontario. As is customary
on such occasions, some alcoholic refreshments were imbibed. On
the return journey, the cool, brisk wind made the water somewhat
choppy . Most of the passengers went below, but Matthews was
sitting on the foredeck. He got up and proceeded toward the stern
of - the boat when, for no apparent reason, he lost his footing
and toppled over backwards into the 44° lF waters of Lake Ontario.
A passenger shouted "Roly's overboard!" MacLaren threw the
boat into neutral as the passengers all scrambled onto the deck.
MacLaren reversed the motors and backed up toward where
Matthews had 'been spotted, about forty to fifty feet astern.
The engines were shut off and the boat drifted toward Matthews .
A life ring and life jacket were thrown into the water by one
passenger. Another tried to hook Matthews with a pikepole .
Matthews, however, made no attempt to assist himself; he merely
floated with outstretched arms, his eyes open and glassy, apparently
unconscious. The boat began to drift away. Once more the engine
was started and the boat backed up toward Matthews . After a
few minutes had elapsed, Horsley, one of the passengers, removed
his shoes and trousers, shouted - "My friend! My friend!", dove
into the icy water and emerged about ten feet from Matthews.
Just then Mrs. Jones, another passenger, noticed Matthews' body
fall forward in the water. She, too, leaped in to help but she
could not prevent Matthews' body from going under the starboard quarter of the boat. Mr . Jones, on seeing his wife in the
water, took over the controls, swung the boat around and approached his wife "bow on", whereupon she was pulled aboard
safely . MacLaren then took over the controls again and picked up
1 [1969] 2 O.R . 137 (High Coure) reversed [1970] 2 O.R. 487 (C.A.) .
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Horsley, but, unfortunately, he could not be resuscitated . According to the testimony of a pathologist, Horsley's death was caused
by cardiac failure resulting from the sudden shock. of being immersed in the cold water. Matthews' body was never recovered
and the exact cause of his death remained unknown, although
it was probably a heart attack also .
At trial, Matthews' family was denied recovery on the ground
that there was no evidence that his death was caused by MacLaren.
Horsley's family was awarded damages at trial, but the Ontario
Court of Appeal reversed this decision .
These facts raise several important legal issues . The first
matter is whether there was any duty to rescue in the circumstances. The second problem is the standard of care expected of
one who attempts a lifesaving operation, that is the duty of the
rescuer. Thirdly, there is the issue of the nature of the duty to
the rescuer who is injured during such an effort . I shall now deal
with each of these problems in order.

Duty to rescue
The common law does not require anyone to come to the
aid of anyone else, except in a few specific situations . A general
duty of affirmative action, it is felt, might infringe unduly upon
individual liberty, might endanger potential rescuers and might
create too many problems of administration . There are, however,
certain relationships which do give rise to a positive duty to render
assistance . For example, a bailee, a master, an innkeeper, a
shopkeeper may be required to act. Someone who negligently injures another is bound to see that he receives medical attention as
may be someone who is in control of an instrumentality which
causes damage without neligence. Similarly, one who undertakes
to assist also assumes a limited obligation.'
There has been a remarkable development in the use of penal
legislation to create new tort duties in recent years. Moving by
analogy and in sympathy with the legislative policies enshrined
in criminal statutes, courts have established new civil duties to
act where none had existed before . In Monk v . Warbey,' for example, a civil obligation to buy liability insurance was created
by relying on a penal statute to this effect . A civil duty to stop
and render aid has been based on hit-and-run legislation' So, too,
new tort obligations have been founded on violations of statutes
that require railways to fence their tracks" and hotels to deny
' See generally Linden, Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance (1966),
44 Can. Bar Rev. 25.
1 Ibid.
1 [19351 1 K.B . 75 .
SSee Brooks v. Willig Transport Co. (1953), 40 Cal. 2d 669, 255
P. 2d 802.
"Colonial Coach Lines v. Bennett & C.P.R . (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d)
367 (Ont . C.A.) .
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alcoholic beverages to intoxicated patrons .'
Matthews v. MacLaren has made a major contribution to the
jurisprudence in this area . Justice Lacourciere, at trial, in an
impressive judgment, extended the "quasi-contractual" duty of the
carrier to his passenger so that it would apply to the master of a
pleasure boat and his invited guest. His Lordship found some support for this position in section 526 of the Canada Shipping Act'
which reads :
The master or person in charge of a vessel shall, so far as he can do so
without serious danger to his own vessel, her crew and passengers, if
any, render assistance to every person, even if that person be a subject
of a foreign state at war with Her Majesty, who is found at sea and
in danger of being lost, and if he fails to do so he is liable to a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars.

Justice Lacourciere following the legislative policy enshrined
in the statute contended: "Parliament reflecting the conscience of
the community has seen fit to impose on the master a duty to render
assistance to any stranger, including an enemy alien `found at sea
and in danger of being lost' . . .; the common law can be no less
solicitous for the safety of an invited, guest and must impose upon
the master the duty to attempt a rescue, when this can be done
without imperilling the safety of the vessel, her crew and passengers . The common law must keep pace with the demands and
expectations of a civilized community, the sense of social obligation, and brand as tortious negligence the failure to help a man
overboard in accordance with the universal custom of the sea."'
is Lordship also supported his decision on the ground that one
who undertakes a rescue operation assumes a duty to act reasonably .
This reasoning emerged unscathed from the Court of Appeal .
Justice Jessup, in his perceptive judgment, argued that section 526
covered not only strangers "found at sea" but also passengers . He
declared that he was unable to "adopt . . . an interpretation which
would ascribe to Parliament a solicitude for the lives of alien
enemies at the same time denied by it to passengers and crews
of Canadian ships ."" He, therefore, assumed that the Canada
Shipping Act, "on one or the other of the legal theories by which
the courts attach civil consequences to the breach of a penal
provision in a statute, will support a cause of action . . .".
Justice Jessup also agreed with Justice Lacourciere's ascription of a duty to the master of a ship, to rescue a passenger who
falls overboard. These are his words : "The common law reluc7

Menow v. Honsberger & Jordan House Ltd., [19701 1 O.R . 54 (Haines

$ R.C .S ., 1952, c. 29, as am .
e (196912 O.R. 137, at p. 143 .
io [19701 2 O.R . 487, at p. 500.
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tance to penalize non-feasance has yielded to a duty of affirmative
care in situations of special relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant as employer and employee, carrier and passenger
and occupier and his lawful visitor . A passenger on a ship is in
the position of total dependence on the master and I think that
peculiar relationship must now be recognized as invoking a duty
of the master, incident to the duty to use due care in the carriage
by sea of a passenger, of aid against the perils of the sea. Falling
overboard is such a peril and in that situation I do not think
the common law can do otherwise than to adopt the statutory
duty to render assistance .""
Justice Schroeder (McGillivray J.A. concurring) was not as
enthusiastic as Justice Jessup about utilizing the criminal law to
create new tort duties .
Justice Schroeder, in his well-reasoned judgment, refused to
accept the notion that the breach of the statute "created" a legal
duty to rescue and to use reasonable care in the process. The trial
judge was correct in declining to treat the enactment in this way.
Nevertheless, he asserted that: "Parliament, in enacting the section,
gave expression to humanitarian principles which should guide the
consciences of civilized men in their relations even to an enemy
who was found in peril at sea and this must have an important
bearing on the question as to whether a moral or social duty resting upon the master of a vessel traversing navigable waters to
come to the rescue of a passenger who through his own misfortune
falls overboard can be ripened into a legal duty not only to come
to his passenger's aid, but also to exercise reasonable care in
the rescue procedure .""
Justice Schroeder recognizes that it is the civil courts, not the
legislatures, that are creating these new tort duties by analogy to
penal statutes . In most cases the civil courts should follow the
criminal law in deciding whether to establish new tort duties, although they need not do so in every case . The legislative policies
advanced by penal legislation are generally worthy of respect and
support. This is so for reasons of comity, democracy, consistency
and superior legislative expertise. Moreover, an additional civil
deterrent may foster stricter obedience to the criminal law."
Duty of the rescuer

One of the paradoxes of the law in this area has been that a
Bad Samaritan goes free while a Good Samaritan, who bungles a
rescue attempt, can be saddled with civil liability. Although there
11 Ibid., at p. 501.
12 Ibid., at p. 492.
's Linden, op . cit., footnote 2, at p. 64 . See also Weiler, Legal Values
and Judicial Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
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are few reported cases against Good Samaritans," the law may
act as a disincentive to potential rescuers. Doctors, in particular,
have expressed a disinclination to offer assistance to those in peril
and in recognition of this problem several jurisdictions have enacted Good Samaritan legislation which relieves doctors and others
from liability in these circumstances, unless there is gross negligence."
The Matthews decision casts light on this problem. The trial
judge, Lacourciere J., seemed ready to exact the usual standard of
reasonable care from the rescuer: "What would the reasonable
boat operator do in the circumstances . . .?", he asked . , On the
basis of the evidence, he found the defendant negligent in that
he used the "wrong procedure" in backing up the boat to affect
the rescue because of his "excessive consumption of alcohol" ."
The Court of Appeal, however, held that there was only an
error in judgment, not negligence. Relying on East Suffolk River
Catchment Board v. Kent," Justice Jessup adopted a different test
for these rescue cases. He felt that "where a person gratuitously
and without any duty to do so undertakes to confer a benefit
upon or go to the aid of another he incurs no liability unless what
he does worsens the condition of that other" ." Disagreeing with
the trial judge, Justice Jessup stated : "I think it is an unfortunate
development in the law which leaves the Good Samaritan liable
to be mulcted in damages and apparently in the United States
it is one that has produced a marked reluctance of doctors to aid
victims." Justice Schroeder warned judges not to treat Donoghue
v. Stevenson" as an "open invitation to . . . depart from their
traditional function as expounders and interpreters of the law and
to assume the function of legislators" ." His Lordship asserted
that "the law must ever continue to be a living force to achieve
its true ends, and judges have not shrunk from the task of moulding the law to keep pace with changing mores as civilization progresses" . Consequently, "if a person embarks upon a rescue, he
is not under any liability to the person to whose aid he has come
so long as discontinuance of his efforts did not leave the other
in a worse condition than when he took charge". He concluded
that the rescue effort of MacLaren did not worsen Matthews'
position, even though it may not have complied with the standard
of "text-book perfection" laid down by the expert evidence and
"See Zelenko v . Gimbel Bros . (1935), 287 N.Y.S . 134.
"See, for example, The Emergency Medical Aid Act, S .A., 1969, c .
28, s . 3 .
"'Supra, footnote 9, at pp . 145-146 .
1' [19411 A.C . 74 .
is [1970] 2 O .R. 487, at p. 500 .
is
[19321 A.C . 562 .
20
Supra, footnote 10, at p . 493 .
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adopted by the trial judge . Justice Schroeder said "It is ever so
easy to be wise after the event . . .".
Justice Schroeder was probably too lenient in his assessment of
the defendant's conduct. MacLaren was guilty of more than a mere
slip ; he adopted a totally wrong procedure . Moreover, the trial
judge had the opportunity of hearing the evidence and his findings should be given more weight by the Court of Appeal.
It is hard to know whether the Kent rule" will actually alter the
conduct of potential rescuers. At the least, however, it will be
more difficult for them to offer fear of civil liability as an excuse
for refusing to grant assistance . Let us hope that Good Samaritanism will be advanced thereby .
Duty to the rescuer

The trial judgment in Matthews articulated with clarity the
duty to a rescuer, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision
on the unfortunate ground of lack of foresight. Justice Lacourciere
used the risk theory to recognize the duty to Horsley, the rescuer .
His Lordship felt that his "conduct was not futile, reckless, rash,
wanton or foolhardy", and that he "was not guilty of contributory
negligence" ." Nor did it matter that the person being rescued
could not have been helped . Volenti was rejected, first because it
was not pleaded, and second, because the plaintiff did not freely
and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of
the risk he ran, impliedly agree to incur it . Justice Lacourciere
concluded that the defendant's negligence in effecting the rescue
induced the rescuer which was "within the risk created by the
defendant's negligent conduct" ."
The Court of Appeal, however, denied compensation to Horsley. Justice Jessup agreed that a rescue attempt by a passenger is
a foreseeable consequence of a mishandled rescue attempt. Nevertheless, His Lordship felt that a rescue by Horsley in particular
could not be reasonably anticipated, since he had been warned to
remain in the cabin because of his inexperience with boating .
"By that command . . ." said Justice Jessup, "MacLaren insulated Horsley from such perils of the voyage as were eventually
encountered . . ." .2'
Justice Schroeder went even further in limiting the protection
afforded to rescuers. He stated : "The temperature of the water and
the continuing efforts of all on board to bring Matthews to the
safety of the vessel all militated against such an act on the part of
any of the passengers as a probability to be reasonably anticipated .
Nothing in the evidence points to Horsley's knowledge of the
2' Supra, footnote 17 .
"Supra, footnote 9, at p. 149.
ss Ibid., at p. 150.
"Supra, footnote 10, at p. 502 .
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proper operation of a boat in an emergency of this kind, nor
is there any evidence which suggests that he had any valid reason
for supposing that MacLaren's conduct in the circumstances was
not what it ought to be. Moreover, MacLaren had told Horsley to
confine himself to the cockpit or cabin. 1t is not suggested that
Horsley had made his intention known to MacLaren, and it would
scarcely be anticipated in any event that any passenger would dive
into the water without at least taking precautions for his own
safety by donning a life jacket or attaching a rope to himself,
especially when he could see the effect that the very cold water
had had upon Matthews .""
Such a slavish reliance on foresight is downright disappointing." To accept Justice Jessup's reasoning would be to require
foresight of a particular individual prior to the recognition of a
duty owed to him, a theory that was impliedly rejected in Jones v.
Wabigwan ." lçoreseeability is an elusive enough concept already.
To expect this kind of precise foresight is unacceptable and contrary to authority." Justice Schroeder's view is even harsher. Although he is on sound ground when he states that without negligence on behalf of the defendant there can be no recovery by a
rescuer, he is not when he discusses the specific nature of the rescue
attempt. It is true that an effort to save someone can be so utterly
stupid as to fall outside the ambit of the law's protection. If this
occurs there is said to be no duty owed to that rescuer and
foresight is an important element in this determination . Such a
result would follow if someone jumped off the fifty-fourth floor of
the Toronto-Dominion Centre to rescue a child on the road . But
where a rescue attempt is merely unwise or careless, the courts
should and do handle it as a problem of contributory negligence
and reduce the amount of the rescuer's recovery, rather than eliminate it altogether.
Another defect in the Court of Appeal's decision is the conclusion that the disobedience of the order to stay below was unforeseeable ." The courts have recognized as foreseeable acts that
are much more unexpectable such as the violation of the rules
of a transit company," the theft of articles" and even suicide."
The flouting of an order to stay below, is not -unforeseeable in the
ss Ibid., at p. 496 .
se See below.
Z' [19701 1 O.R . 366, reversing [1968] 2 O .R . 837 .
" See Hughes v . Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C . 837, 1 All E .R. 705 .
" See generally on this problem, Linden, Down with Foreseeability!
Of Thin Skulls and Rescuers (1969), 47 Can . Bar Rev . 545.
"Harris v. T .T .C. and Miller, [1967] S .C .R. 460 .
"Stansbie v. Troman, [1948] 2 K.B. 48, 1 All E.R . 599 (C.A.) ; Patten
v. Silberschein, [1936] 3 W .W .R . 169, 51 B .C.R . 133 ; cf. Duce v. Rourke
(1951), 1 W .W.R . 305 (Alta) .
"Pigney v . Pointers Transport Services, Ltd., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1121,
2 All E .R . 807 ; Stadel v. Albertson, [1954] 2 D .L .R. 328 (Bask .) .
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emergency situation that arose.
My criticism of the judgment of the Court of Appeal is not
limited to the application of the foresight rule-it goes to the foresight rule itself. Our courts must not continue to invoke it or reject
it whenever they wish. They must give us more guidance on how
they decide which results will be within the scope of the risk and
which will fall outside it. In the rescue area, the courts do their
utmost to encourage responsible attempts at saving life and property. The rescuer is not and should not be denied aid unless he is
absolutely foolhardy . Rather than using foresight theory, the courts
should regulate careless lifesaving efforts by the device of comparative negligence, which is more flexible and more just. Perhaps the Supreme Court of Canada will use this opportunity to
clarify and improve the law in this area by restoring the trial
decision of Justice Lacourciere .
ALLEN M. LINDEN*
JURISDICTION OVER THE MANUFACTURER OF IMPORTED GOODS IN
CASES OF NEGLIGENCE-THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH APPROACH .-It is often necessary to determine where the tort of
negligence is committed, either in connexion with service on a
foreign defendant under Order 11 of the English Rules of Supreme
Court or their equivalent in other Commonwealth countries, or
to enable a court to apply the Rule in Phillips v. Eyre' after
jurisdiction has been taken by the forum on other grounds, and it
appears that the tort may have been committed outside the jurisdiction. A finding that the tort was committed within the jurisdiction will relieve a court of difficulties that might arise if the tort
was justifiable by the lex loci delicti under the second head of
Phillips v. Eyre.
If leave is obtained from the court, a plaintiff is enabled to
serve a foreign defendant under Order 11 of the English Rules
of Supreme Court or their Canadian or Australian province or
state equivalent . One such case is under the English Order 11,
rule 1(h) "where the action is founded on a tort committed within
the jurisdiction". Since the case of Kroch v. Rossell et Cie' it
has been apparent that, in contrast to the contract rule set out in
the English Order 11, rule 1(g), the tort must have a substantial
connexion with England so that the mere fact that an isolated
copy of defamatory material published abroad reaches England
*Allen M. Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
' (1869), L.R. 6 Q.B . 1. As to recent problems in this area see (1969),
1 A.C .L . Rev. 122; (1970), 33 Mod. L. Rev. 1; (1970), 20 U. Tor. L.J . 81 .
2 [19371 1 All E.R . 725.

